Mass Tort Litigation: Congress\u27s Silent, But Deadly, Reform Effort by Davis, Mary J.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications 
Spring 1997 
Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent, But Deadly, Reform Effort 
Mary J. Davis 
University of Kentucky College of Law, mjdavis@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Mary J. Davis, Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent, But Deadly, Reform Effort, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 913 
(1997). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent, But Deadly, Reform Effort 
Notes/Citation Information 
Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 913-937 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/274 
MASS TORT LITIGATION: CONGRESS'S
SILENT, BUT DEADLY, REFORM EFFORT
MARY J. DAVIS*
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 913
II. THE UNIQUENESS OF MASS TORT LITIGATION .............. 917
A. Numerosity ................................... 918
B. Commonality of Issues, Defendants and Claim Values ..... 919
III. THE DIRECT TREATMENT OF MASS TORT LITIGATION
IN THE A CT ......... ............................. 921
A. The Definitions ................................. 921
B. The Statute of Repose ............................ 921
C. The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act ("BAAA ") ......... 923
IV. THE INDIRECT TREATMENT OF MASS TORT LITIGATION
BY THE A CT ..................................... 927
A. Punitive Damages Caps ......................... 927
1. Effect of Punitive Damages Availability on
Claiming Behavior ........................... 928
2. Effect of Punitive Damages Cap on Deterrence
of Culpable Conduct ......................... 930
B. Several Liability for Noneconomic Loss ............... 932
C. Workers' Compensation Subrogation ................. 934
D. Other Provisions ............................... 936
V . CONCLUSION .................................... 936
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed The Common Sense Product Liability and Legal
Reform Act' ("Act"), it seemingly ignored the most important category of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1979,
University of Virginia; J.D. 1985, Wake Forest University School of Law. My thanks to the
Tennessee Law Review and Professor Jerry Phillips for asking me to participate in this
Symposium. I have enjoyed working on the topic and with the editors and appreciate their
professionalism and expertise.
I. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). For the legislative history of the Act, see H.R.
REP. No. 104-481 (1996) (Joint Conference Committee Report); S. REP. No. 104-69 (1995)
(Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 565, the Senate
predecessor bill to H.R. 956); H.R. REP. No. 104-64, pt. I (1995) (Committee on the
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products liability litigation for the past decade and for the foreseeable future:
mass tort litigation.2 Upon closer inquiry, however, it appears that many
of the Act's provisions, if enacted, would drastically affect mass tort
litigation and in ways that would perversely affect the behavior of
tortfeasors who cause the most harm, in terms both of actual numbers and
the nature of the harm.
To the extent that tort law deters tortious behavior, it does so most
effectively when the liability imposed is proportional to the magnitude of
the harm caused.3 But the Act would turn this result on its head in the mass
tort context. Many of the well-founded criticisms of the Act by the
participants in this Syposium4 are even more profound when applied to the
mass tort context. Most mass tort litigation problems are thought to be
procedural, i.e. how to aggregate the claims for resolution while preserving
the value of individualized litigation. Although a variety of organizations,
including the American Law Institute5 , have meaningfully studied the
procedural problems and proposed concrete changes to the current system
Judiciary report on H.R. 956); H.R. REP. No. 104-63, pt. I (1995) (Committee on Commerce
report on H.R. 956).
H.R. 956 was approved by the Joint Conference Committee on March 19. 1996. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481 (1996). President Clinton received the Conference Report bill
on April 30, 1996, and vetoed it on May 2, 1996. See John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes
Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at A14; Neil A. Lewis, President
Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al; The Lawyers' Veto,
WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A12. A veto override that was attempted in the House on
May 9, 1996 in order to preserve a record on the issue fell twenty-three votes short of
passage. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal Product Liability
Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1363, 1365 n.18 (1996).
For the full text of H.R. 956, see Symposium, Is H.R. 956 Really "Common Sense"?:
A Symposium on Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 64 TENN. L. REV. 557, 559-94 (1997).
2. This article will address mass product liability litigation specifically. Mass
accident tort litigation, such as airplane disasters, large scale building fires or collapses is
certainly mass tort litigation but not of the perplexing character of the mass product use/harm
cases of which medical devices, pharmaceutical and toxic substance cases are the primary
examples.
3. Doctrines like causation, both actual and proximate, are intended to insure, at least
in part, that culpability is proportionate to liability. This concept lies at the heart of
negligence law-it is only the unreasonable behavior that we seek to deter. However, once
an actor is culpable, he is liable for all harms which result, whether those consequences are
foreseeable or not. This is, of course, the eggshell-skull plaintiff rule which is as old as tort
law. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
4. See Symposium, Is H.R. 956 Really "Common Sense"?: A Symposium on Federal
Tort Reform Legislation, 64 TENN. L. REV. 557 (1997) (In particular, see articles by Eaton,
Finley, Hager, Phillips, Rustad, Werber, and Wertheimer).
5. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) [hereinafer COMPLEX LITIGATION]. For a
discussion of these proposals, see infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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for resolving mass torts, Congress wholly failed to address these procedural
issues. Rather, Congress instead has attempted to enact substantive reforms
which will detrimentally affect the very nature of the rights and responsibili-
ties in the mass tort context.6
This article explores the ways in which the Act treats mass tort litigation
issues. The Act does so both directly and indirectly. The direct methods
of reform are mostly industry-specific and, thus, almost inconsequential in
contrast to the indirect treatment. The indirect, almost clandestine, methods
of reform are the most insidious and provide the most cause for concern as
Congress once again attempts to "reform" products liability by reintroducing
the Act in 1997 Given the President's early indication that a reform
measure could meet with his approval, but that this one in its present form
did not, it is not surprising that Congress is reviving the Act this term. This
action illustrates Congress's failure to recognize the significant differences
between mass tort litigation and "run-of-the-mill" products liability
litigation' and shows, at the very least, a startling lack of understanding of
the complexity of current product liability litigation and, at most, a
purposeful effort to immunize from responsibility those who cause the
greatest harm to the largest number of people.
The original draft of this article began with the thought that in drafting
and negotiating the Act, Congress simply failed to appreciate the significant
differences between mass tort litigation and the nm-of-the-mill products
liability case. Consequently, the original goal of this article was to
illuminate these differences and point out why they do or do not need atten-
6. Earlier works by this author have focused on the skewed application of tort rights
and responsibilities; most recently, the Supreme Court's contribution to a culture of
irresponsibility through its recent product liability decisions. See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme
Court and our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075 (1996).
7. Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997).
8. Run-of-the-mill is used here to mean durable goods product liability litigation-
the lawn mower that cuts off a foot, the press brake that mangles an arm. "Durable goods"
is defined in the Act, but neither "mass tort" nor any variation on that theme is treated. See
H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 101(7) (1996) ("durable goods"). In addition, "product" is defined
as "any object, substance, mixture, or raw material" capable of delivery alone or in
combination with other parts, a definition which clearly can embrace most substances which
lead to mass tort cases such as asbestos, medical devices, tobacco products, and other
chemicals. See id. § 107(14)(A) ("product"). Congress must have had some idea of the
types of products which lead to mass tort cases because it chose to exclude blood and organ
products from the definition of "products." Id. § 107(14)(B) (except to the extent that such
items are subject to a state "standard of liability other than negligence"). This exclusion is
likely a result of the widespread enactment of blood shield statutes throughout the country,
limiting liability to negligence, if at all. See, e.g., Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc.,
532 A.2d 1081, 1086 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (listing 48 jurisdictions with blood
shield statutes); see generallyMichael J. Miller, Strict Liability, Negligenceand the Standard
of Care for Transfusion-TransmittedDisease, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 490 (1994).
1997]
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tion. Upon closer look, however, it became clear that many provisions of
the Act deal pervasively with mass tort litigation and that Congress may
have purposefully written the Act so as to extend its protections to those
putative tortfeasors who do the most harm. Congress could not have been
unaware of the effect of the Act's provisions in such cases. Rather, the
indirect effect on mass tort litigation would make needed procedural reforms
and exploration of aggregation methods currently in process9 essentially
irrelevant because the value of the claims would be so significantly reduced
that "mass torts" as a unique category of products liability claims would
virtually cease to exist.
This article examines the ways in which the Act would significantly
affect mass tort litigation to the detriment of claimants and concludes that
the rights and responsibilities so dramatically juxtaposed in mass tort
litigation are neither fully nor fairly addressed. As with most litigation
phenomena, the alleged "crisis du jour" which Congress treats in the Act
leads, as do hard cases, to bad law particularly in the mass tort context. A
more focused and dispassionate review of the needs of mass tort litigation
appears in order and has, in fact, been ongoing for several years."0
One of the stated purposes behind the Act is to reduce the unacceptable
costs and delays in our civil justice system associated with excessive
litigation." A primary culprit in causing the delays has been mass tort
claims which have "threatened to overwhelm the civil justice system,
accounting for more than one-quarter of the entire civil caseload in certain
9. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 5; JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism:A
Proposal to Amend the MultidistrictLitigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of
Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529 (1995)
(exploring aggregation methods to resolve mass tort litigaion).
10. A number of scholars,judges, and practitioners have been engaged in debate over
how to treat the specific issues presented in mass tort litigation, particularly regarding
aggregation techniques. For a sampling of these articles, see Symposium, National Mass Tort
Conference, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1523 (1995) (with articles by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist; Judge William W. Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center; Judge Sam
C. Pointer, Jr., trial judge in the silicone gel breast implant litigation; Deborah R. Hensler,
Senior Policy Analyst at the Rand Institute for Civil Justice who has studied mass tort
litigation for at least a decade; and Professor Judith Resnik, who has written extensively on
aggregation and procedural issues in mass tort litigation). Congress has also specifically
addressed mass tort litigation issues in the past. The enactment of the Multidistrict Panel
Litigation Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (c)(i)-(c)(ii) (1988), is one such recent example.
Recently the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, the same one that produced the
Act which is the subject of this Symposium, has considered the Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong. (1993). For a full discussion of the alternatives
debated in recent years, see Schwarzer et al., supra note 9, at 1533-41.
11. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(4) (1996) (Findings and Purposes).
[Vol. 64:913
MASS TORT LITIGATION
courts.' 2 In addition, only ten to twenty percent of potential tort plain-
tiffs, and a mere two to ten percent of product accident victims pursue a
claim, while 100 to 200 percent of mass tort victims actually file suit. 3
Thus, the need for reform of run-of-the mill products litigation is suspect in
light of the claiming behavior of accident victims. Congress's intent
primarily to deal with a litigation crisis in that arena becomes more and
more unlikely. Rather, it would not be farfetched to suggest that it is mass
tort litigation that was a primary aim of Congress's reform efforts because
it is the most drastically affected by the Act's attempts to correct the
perceived wrongs of juries and litigants of the past decades.
II. THE UNIQUENESS OF MASS TORT LITIGATION
Crucial to understanding the importance of mass tort litigation in the
bigger products liability litigation picture is a clear explanation of what
constitutes a "mass tort." A variety of circumstances can combine to give
rise to what most knowledgeable observers call a mass tort. Clearly, it
would be erroneous to label all types of litigation involving numerous
plaintiffs with similar problems mass tort litigation. In fact, it is more likely
to be true that there are many varieties of litigation that constitute mass tort
litigation. "
It is possible that mass torts are not a unique category of product
liability cases, but are simply a lot of run-of-the-mill cases resulting from
the conduct of a handful of defendants. Many products liability cases could
fall within this category. For example, most design defect litigation, which
involves an entire product line allegedly flawed, thus, injuring a large
number of people, falls in this category. In fact, the Act could well signify
Congress's belief that no torts are mass torts and, thus, there is no need to
consider any unique features of that litigation in drafting product liability
reform legislation. This conclusion is consistent with the instrumentalist
perspective of handling litigation on an individual basis seeking to deter a
specific defendant from engaging in specific conduct potentially injurious
to a specific individual.' 5
In a particularly helpful and enlightening study, Professors Hensler and
Peterson define the three factors that distinguish mass torts from ordinary
12. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass.Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 961 (1993).
13. Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1821, 1823 (1995) (citing DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL
INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (Rand 1991)); see S. REP. No. 104-69, at 58 (1995)
(minority views of Sen. Hollings).
14. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 1825-26 (describing the existence of various
mass torts and procedural handling of each).
15. See id. at 1824-25.
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products liability personal injury litigation: "the large number of claims
associated with a single 'litigation'; the commonality of issues and actors
among claims within a litigation; and the interdependence of claim
values.' 6  The examples are well-known: Dalkon Shield intrauterine
device litigation involving hundreds of thousands of claims against one
defendant; silicone gel breast implant litigation, similarly involving
thousands of claimants against a handful of defendants; and, if the reader
will excuse a pun on an overused expression, the "mother of all mass torts,"
asbestos exposure litigation which will involve millions of claimants against
many hundreds of manufacturers. In fact, it is the asbestos litigation which
causes many observers to opine that no other litigation crisis even exists:
asbestos-related suits alone accounted for approximately 60 percent of the
growth in federal civil filings between 1976 and 1986."7 If asbestos cases
are excluded, the number of product liability cases in the federal courts has,
by at least one account, declined, 8 and, by most accounts, the defendants
are more often successful in those that are pursued. 9
Most observers of mass tort litigation use the above criteria for defining
mass tort litigation and as a basis for discussing issues that are unique to it.
This article will do the same. And as mentioned above, 0 Congress has
treated many issues of mass tort litigation specially, at least for management
and resolution matters, so one might expect the same to be true for the
substantive issues. As will be seen, that has not been the case with the
provisions of the Act.
A. Numerosity
The numerosity factor is self-explanatory, but as Professor Hensler
notes, there is nothing intuitively different, and thus possibly requiring
16. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 965. "Numerosity is the primary defining
chracteristic .... The high visibility of mass torts and the burdens they impose on courts
and parties are direct consequences of the large numbers of claims in each litigation." Id.
17. S. REP. No. 104-69, at 60 (1995) (quoting GAO report and Rand Corporation
study on federal court civil filings).
18. Id. at 59 (citing Transcript of testimony of Prof Marc Galanter, Director,
Institute of Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law School, before the Consumer
Subcommittee, Sept. 19, 1991, at 86-87); see Michael L. Rustad, NationalizingTort Law: The
Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
673 (1996) [hereinafter Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law] (summarizing recent studies on the
awarding of punitive damages and non-economic losses). This fact becomes crucial to an
understanding of why the Act's reforms are so insidious in their potential application to mass
tort litigation. For a discussion of Congress's repeated refusal to legislate regarding asbestos
personal injury litigation, see infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
19. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992) (explaining the decline in plaintiff verdicts
over the past decade).
20. See supra note 10.
[Vol. 64:913
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special attention or treatment, about cases which have common characteris-
tics just because there are a lot of them.2 The automobile accident case is
the perfect example: there are thousands filed every day, yet no one would
suggest automobile accident litigation is a "mass tort." The claiming
behavior of mass tort litigants is what leads to the large numbers of
cases.
22
B. Commonality of Issues, Defendants and Claim Values
The most crucial characteristic and the most meaningful difference with
regular tort litigation and for purposes of the Act's effect, is the combination
of the commonality of issues and the unusually small number of potential
culpable parties. Because the culpability in mass tort cases lies either with
one defendant or a few defendants in the same industry, the course of the
litigation for all defendants is drastically affected by what happens to the
first few.
Similarly, once liability issues are decided in even one case, the value
of the remaining cases is significantly affected. Professor Hensler describes
this phenomenon as the "claim value interdependence" characteristic.23 If
the first claims lose, as in the tobacco cases,24 the value of all remaining
cases is reduced significantly, at least according to the defendants who will
settle or not depending on the success of the defense of those first cases.
Similarly, as soon as one case is successful, hope springs in the hearts of re-
maining claimants, and of course their attorneys, that future successes are
possible. The dollar value of those first successes is crucial as well. Once
Rose Cipollone's estate was successful against the tobacco industry, both
defendants and plaintiffs claimed victory. Defendants claimed victory
because the amount awarded, $400,000, and the basis of liability, express
warranty, were both insignificant when compared to the earlier perceived
21. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 965.
22. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 1823; see also Hensler & Peterson, supra note
12, at 1019-26 (describing the factors which facilitate a high percentage of mass tort claims
being filed: mass media, social networks, physician contacts, plaintiff law firms).
23. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 967-68.
24. For an example of an early defendant success, see Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.,
328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
25. For the preemption decision on appeal of the verdict for Mrs. Cipollone, see
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). For a detailed treatment of the
tobacco litigation and Mrs. Cipollone's story in particular, see Tobacco on Trial, TOBACCO
PROD. LIAB. PROJECT NEWSLETTER, Oct. 15, 1988, at 1-8, reprinted in KEETON ET AL.,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 906 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing
effect of verdict on other plaintiffs lawyers). On the tobacco litigation generally, see Robert
C. Rabin, A SociolegalHistoryofthe Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992)
and Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS
AND CULTURE (R. Rabin & R. Sugarman eds., 1993).
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value of the first successful case. Plaintiffs claimed victory because they
had a jury verdict against the tobacco industry after almost three decades,
and that litigation breathed new life.
While the tobacco litigation may not seem like the best example, given
the combination of political power and extraordinary dedication to fighting
those cases shown by the industry, it indeed serves as an excellent illustra-
tion of what makes a "mass tort" different from an ordinary products
liability case and why the Act so pervasively affects such cases indirectly.
The number of claimants continues to grow, as evidenced by the many state
class actions filed which allege fraud by the industry.26 The evidence of
industry culpability increases as the years progress, not unlike the evolution
in discovery of the culpability of the asbestos industry.27 The issues of
defendant culpability are not specific to any one plaintiff's claims. Surely
what the tobacco companies knew about the addictiveness of nicotine and
how they handled that information is not claimant-specific. There is also a
clear connection between the value of the early and later claims. If the
companies lose one of the state class actions, all other actions will be worth
a great deal more, for settlement evaluation, if nothing else.2" Consequently,
all eyes are on the recently filed class fraud and state Medicaid reimburse-
ment actions to help determine the value of future claims. The Act's cap
on non-economic and punitive damages will have a detrimental effect on the
26. The recent decertification of the attempted federal class action, Castano v. The
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), suggests the presence of all three mass
tort characteristics: (I) mass nature of the alleged harm-tens of thousands, possibly millions,
of claimants were contemplated; (2) the commonality of issues and parties-the presence of
ten or so members of the defendant industry whose conduct was directed at the market, not
at any one plaintiff individually; and (3) the anticipated interdependence of the future claim
values on what might have happened in that class-surely the defendants feared the pressure
to settle that case, one that would have been costly to litigate but perhaps more costly in
reduced public perception and corporate value than any actual settlement amount would be.
Id. at 746-51. Plaintiffs continue to pursue fraud cases against the tobacco industry in state
class actions filed since Castano was decertified. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Engle, 24 P.S.L.R. 945 (BNA Oct. II, 1996) (Florida Supreme Court declines to review class
action certification ruling). The states continue to file suits seeking Medicaid reimbursement
from the tobacco companies for smoking-related health care costs. See, e.g., CCH Prod.
Liab. Rep. No. 878, at I (Feb. 21, 1997) (twenty-one states suing to date and considering
settlement).
27. For a discussion of the asbestos litigation and the evidence of industry culpability,
see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985).
This statement is not supported by any fact finding about the tobacco industry's culpability
on any of the causes of action currently being pursued. It is rather a suggestion that the
parallel to the asbestos litigation regarding the lengthy discovery process of information to
support such actions may be present.
28. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 969.
920 [Vol. 64:913
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value of those claims and, hence, will fail to deter industry and others facing
large-scale litigation in the future.
III. THE DIRECT TREATMENT OF MASS TORT LITIGATION IN THE ACT
A. The Definitions
The Act does not, at first blush, appear to address mass tort litigation.
However, the Act's definitions are sufficiently broad enough to include
traditional cases giving rise to mass torts.
"Product" is defined as "any object, substance, mixture, or raw material"
which is capable of delivery on its own or in combination with other
products.29  The term excludes organs, blood or blood products,3" and
electricity, presumably including electromagnetic field radiation.'
The typical mass tort products of the past are represented by chemicals
and toxic substances (of which asbestos is the primary example but also
including Agent Orange and lead), medical devices (such as the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine device and silicone gel breast implants), pharmaceuticals
(such as diethylstilbestrol ("DES") and Bendectin), and products for
consumption (primarily tobacco). Each of these is a product as defined in
the Act. The only other mass tort products litigation of recent years are
those specifically excluded by the statute: blood and blood products
(obviously including HIV-infected blood) and electricity. Consequently, all
of the mass tort litigation of the last two decades would be affected by the
substantive provisions of the Act.32
While I have defined this aspect of the Act as a direct effect, because
the definition of product includes most products which lead to mass tort
litigation, the Act does not as a whole have the "feel" of a mass tort
litigation reform act because it does not deal directly with the major claims
processing issues and judicial management issues considered to be central
to reform of such litigation. Indirect substantive effects of the Act on mass
tort litigation are reserved until Part IV.
B. The Statute of Repose
The Act provides uniform statutes of limitation and repose.33 Given
29. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 101(14)(A) (1996).
30. Id. § 101(14)(B)(i). Note that blood products are not excluded if the applicable
state standard of liability is other than negligence, id., apparently seeking to limit liability for
blood products to a maximum of negligence liability.
31. Id. § 101(14)(B)(ii).
32. For a discussion of the substantive provisions and their affect on mass torts, see
infra at Part IV.
33. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106(a)-(b) (1996) (statute of limitation and statute of
1997]
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the latent nature of many mass tort harms, a consistent characteristic of mass
torts according to some observers,34 the effect of such a statute on mass
tort victims in particular is significant. The statute of limitations begins to
run from the date on which the claimant discovered, or reasonably should
have discovered, both the harm and its cause.35 The drafters seem to have
had the mass tort victim in mind in this regard. The Conference Report
suggests that it would be unfair to prevent an injured party who could not
discover the harm from pursuing an action,36 though the Report suggests
that the number of persons in this category will be few.37 Such would not
be the case regarding most mass tort products. The DES cases in particular
serve as a good example of the need for a discovery-type rule for mass tort
victims and the large possible number of such victims.
The Act's statute of repose causes more concern for mass tort victims,
though, on its face, it does not apply to many such products. It provides for
a fifteen year period of repose running from the date of first delivery of the
product if the product is a durable good.38 The statute states that no action
may be filed after the fifteen year period if it concerns a durable good
alleged to have caused harm "other than toxic harm. ' 39 "Toxic harm" is
neither defined in the Act, nor does it appear to have any common meaning.
The statute seems to suggest that a product causing such toxic harm, and is
exempt from the statute, must also be a durable good. The inclusion of a
reference to toxic harm seems to have been an afterthought. Does it mean
that products like asbestos fibers and insulation are not included, or does it
mean that durable goods, which also contain a toxin as a component, are
included?
One can speculate on the type of product that could potentially cause a
problem for the Act's application since many pieces of workplace equipment
might be included. The asbestos insulation is one example, though it would
come closest to being a durable good that also causes toxic harm because
its main function and characteristic is dependent on its toxic nature. But
consider the following examples. A worker was exposed to a twenty year-
old transformer containing polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") at the end of
the transformer's life during its break down and PCB disposal. The
repose, respectively).
34. See Patrick F. Harrigan, Comment, Affirmative Judicial Case Management: A
Viable Solution to the Toxic Product Litigation Crisis, 38 ME. L. REv. 339 (1986).
35. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 106(a)(A)-(B) (1996).
36. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481, at 30 (1996).
37. Id. The Senate Report on the predecessor to H.R. 956 in the Senate, S. 565,
suggests that mass tort victims were specifically considered in drafting the statute of
limitations and states that "where the harm has a latency period or becomes manifest only
after repeated exposure to the product, the claimant may not know immediately that he or she
has been harmed or the cause of that harm." Id.; S. REP. No. 104-69, at 42 (1995).
38. H.R. 956,supranote 1, § 106(b)(1). "Durable good" is defined in Section 101(7)
as a product "which has a normal life expectancy of 3 or more years... and which is used
in a trade ... held for [income] production ... or sold ... to a[n] entity for the production
of goods." Id. § 101(7). Most mass tort products, other than toxic substances like asbestos,




transformer is certainly a durable good and one that, allegedly, caused toxic
harm. Does the repose period apply or not? The use of PCBs in industrial
equipment at one time was sufficiently widespread to justify concern that
mass tort litigation might ensue. And what about other applications of the
paradigm workplace toxin, asbestos? Asbestos was incorporated into so
many pieces of equipment that it is very likely many still exist and are in
use. For example, the manufacturer of a control panel containing asbestos
in an encapsulated form incorporated into a piece of machinery is one of
many defendants being sued by a worker in the plant for general asbestos
exposure, and the control panel is now twenty years old. Does the repose
period apply or not? Whether it is Congress's intent to include such cases
needs to be made clear because they are not so farfetched in the nation's
workplace. And it is proper to exclude toxic substances from the applica-
tion of the repose statute given their length of life and the often latent nature
of the diseases they cause.4"
C. The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act ("BAAA ")
The BAAA4  directly affects the liability of producers of many compo-
nent materials of medical devices, one of the primary categories of mass tort
litigation in past years. While nowhere in the BAAA or its legislative
history does it so indicate,42 this legislation appears to be at least partially
in response to the alleged liability of sellers of teflon for its inappropriate
use in the temporomandibular joint ("TMJ") implants which have been the
subject of many lawsuits and at least one multi-district litigation panel for
discovery consolidation.43 This portion of the Act directly addresses a
specific piece of mass tort litigation and does so in a very intriguing way.
40. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 1001-10 (summarizing characteristics
of chemical and toxic substance litigation).
41. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §§ 201-206 (1996) (Title II of H.R. 956).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 104-481, at 33-34 (1996); SEN. REP. No. 104-69, at 53-54
(1995).
43. See, e.g., Apperson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 1103 (7th Cir.
1994) (describing the background of the TMJ implant litigation and discussing the
involvement of duPont in distributing teflon for human implantation); see also In re TMJ
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1995).
It is worth noting, of course, that other medical device litigation involves implantable
devices such as pacemakers and intrauterine, and other contraceptive, devices. These cases
do not, to my knowledge, allege that the basic raw materials of which the implant is made
are inappropriate for use in the human body. See Apperson, 41 F.3d at 1108. Silicone gel
breast implant litigation involves liability for implants, though Dow Coming, the manufactur-
er of most-of the breast implants, is also the primary manufacturer of the silicone and
specifically sought a way to market silicone for implantation purposes, unlike, apparently,
DuPont regarding teflon. For a summary of the allegations in the silicone gel breast implant
litigation, see Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994), also see
generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Heidi L. Feldman, Science and Uncertaintyin
Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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First, the BAAA defines a substantive standard for the liability of
suppliers of biomaterials." The standard is based wholly on the contract
between the supplier and the manufacturer of the implant.45 The propriety
of such a market-based standard is open to question on a variety of grounds,
not the least of which is fairness to the entire class of unwitting claimants.
However, this article's purpose is not to evaluate the merits of this portion
of the Act. Rather, it will focus on Congress's chosen method of dealing
generally with culpability rules in the mass tort context.
Congress must be credited with recognizing that it was defining a rule
of very broad applicability given the magnitude of medical device litigation
in the recent past46 and must similarly have been aware that it was
providing virtual immunity from litigation for an entire category of
potentially culpable defendants. Medical device and pharmaceutical
litigation together constitute the paradigm example of the need for oversight
rules of liability, rules which are intended to protect those who simply do
not have the means to protect themselves from harm created by superior
institutional actors.4 7  Medical device harms fall on the ill-informed
consumer who relies, without choice, on the expertise of those who dispense
advice, render care, and provide the means by which that advice and care
can be implemented.
Congress's choice to provide a virtual wholesale immunity to a category
of institutional actors to the detriment of such claimants is a glorification of
44. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 203(1) (1996) (definition of "biomaterials supplier");
id. § 203(5) ("implant"); id. § 203(8) ("raw material"). Interestingly, "raw material" is
defined as "a substance or product that has a generic use; and may be used in another
application than an implant." Id. §203(8). The prima facie overbreadth of this definition is
remarkable. Does it include safety pins, zippers, thread, straws, and other such products for
which even a child could devise a use in medical procedures?
45. Id. § 205(a)(2). A biomaterials supplierthat is also a manufacturer of the implant
is liable as under state law (e.g., Dow Coming for silicone gel breast implants). See id.
§ 205(b) (defining when a supplier may be considered the manufacturer or if the supplier and
manufacturer are related by common ownership or continuity of business with the implant's
manufacturer). Otherwise, liability to a claimant is limited to whether the supplier that
provided the contracted for material complied with all specifications.
46. One need only look to the press coverage of the silicone gel breast implant
litigation and the process of the settlement of the class action in that litigation to agree that
Congress was fully aware of the large number of claimants in medical device litigation when
drafting this legislation. See, e.g., Mark Corridan, Implant Global Settlement in Jeopardy,
81 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 34; Gina Kolata, New Study Finds No Link Between Implants
and Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1995, at A 18. And everyone is on notice of the Dalkon
Shield litigation in which hundreds of thousands of women claimed harm.
47. I have used the term institutional actors to define the entire category of product
liability defendants including manufacturers, governments, and distributors. See Davis, supra
note 6, at 1075. These defendants are characterized by their superior knowledge of risk,
resources to affect product risk, and influence in society.
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irresponsibility and a wholesale rejection of fairness concerns for society's
most vulnerable consumer. The rule chosen is perilously close to the now-
discredited, contract-based, priority-laden rules of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. This is not to suggest that liability should
automatically attach to the provider of raw materials for medical device use;
only that Congress's apparent preferred method of protecting this particular
class of defendants is extremely overbroad given the large quantity of harms
suffered. Congress's choice volumes regarding a culture of irresponsibility
that is being perpetuated by society's institutions of government." This
culture of irresponsibility makes society think it is the manufacturers that are
put upon for having to respond to allegations of liability and that the
claimants should be ashamed for having suggested that liability should even
attach. Congress's effort to keep claimant's hands out of this particular
class of "deep pockets" is misdirected given the respective levels of
information of the parties to this category of mass tort litigation. The stories
of good ideas turning bad in the medical device context are simply too many
to justify such a widespreade protection against liability for this class of
defendants.
To the extent there is a need for federal legislation in this area,49 it
would have been simple to provide a mechanism by which the biomaterials
supplier is given limited protection from liability. This commentator is not
persuaded that a seller of a material whose primary function is a generic,
non-medical use, should be given any immunity from liability for its
decision to make a tidy profit on a product's sale for a use which it has little
independent reason to believe will be appropriate. The immunity is
especially inappropriate given the huge potential for harm from implanting
anything in the human body. In such circumstances, a very high standard
of care should be in place. But if a legitimate social policy decision could
be made to protect the biomaterials market and to encourage research into
such appropriate uses, the supplier could be protected from liability unless
the manufacturer is not subject to jurisdiction in any court in this country
or is bankrupt or similarly unavailable to satisfy a judgment. The burden
of the unavailability of the device manufacturer should not, in all fairness,
fall on the victim when the supplier has within its power the ability to
anticipate such a potential harm and impose a premium on its sale price to
accommodate it. Congress has written a similar provision in the context of
other product sellers in this very Act. 0
If the immunity from liability were not enough protection for the
institutional actors benefitted by the BAAA, the Act, secondly, provides
48. Id.
49. There will be significant debate about the need for federal intervention here. See
Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18, at 673; Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the
Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (1996).
50. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 103(b) (1996).
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special procedural protections to insure the speedy, burden-free dismissal for
the protected defendant.5' The Act does not make special immunity a
defense in the traditional sense, where the defendant has the burden of proof
of the facts supporting the defense. Rather, the BAAA defines a presump-
tion of no liability that requires the plaintiff to rebut or suffer dismissal."
First, the court "shall consider a defendant to be a biomaterials supplier who
is not subject to an action for harm to a claimant. 53 The court is required
to grant a motion to dismiss based on this presumption unless the claimant
demonstrates that the defendant is a manufacturer under Section 205(b) or
a seller under Section 205(c). 4 If the plaintiff seeks to impose liability
based on a defendant's failure to comply with the contract under section
205(d), the defendant can obtain summary judgment only if "the evidence
submitted by the claimant would be sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
reach a verdict for the claimant if the jury found the evidence to be
credible."55  This, of course, turns the usual summary judgment standard
of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on its head since it is the
movant who must usually present evidence sufficient to support a finding of
no genuine issue of material fact, and the facts are to be considered in a
light favorable to the non-movant 6
It is unclear why there should be such procedural protections in this
discrete category of litigation. It is evidence, however, of an appreciation
of the uniqueness of mass tort litigation in that most of the efforts aimed at
"reforming" mass tort litigation have involved seeking procedural methods
to streamline the litigation and to resolve it fairly and efficiently without the
judicial administration problems such huge caseloads present. The BAAA
51. Id.
52. Id. § 206(c).
53. Id. § 206(c)(3).
54. Id. § 206(c)(3)(B). The key phrase is that the claimant must demonstrate that the
defendant meets the applicable requirements for liability, turning the traditional burden of
proof of such an affirmative defense on its head. If the defendant may be liable as a
manufacturer under section 205(b), the defendant may file an affidavit demonstrating it has
not listed the implant device with the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). Id.
§ 206(c)(I )(A). Then, the plaintiff must respond with an affidavit rebutting all other ways
in which the defendant may be considered a manufacturer under section 205(b). Id.
§ 206(c)(I)(B). Pending this dismissal, no other discovery of the defendant can be
undertaken, protecting the defendant further from the traditional discovery process where
discovery can continue in the face of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Id.
§ 206(c)(2). Given the length of time it takes to resolve such motions, this could be a
lengthy delay in the process if the plaintiff successfully meets the procedural burdens.
55. Id. § 206(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
56. FED. R. Cv. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has defined the summary judgment
standards in the 1986 trilogy of cases. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
[Vol. 64:913
MASS TORT LITIGATION
requirement that plaintiffs will suffer summary judgment on the one basis
of liability left to them in this area, unless they can prove entitlement to
proceed, would certainly have the effect of dealing with the high caseload
problem. While summary judgment is a good means of dealing with cases
in which a plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to justify
proceeding to trial, it would seem only fair that the burden to obtain such
a result should be placed upon the party seeking the result, as is the case in
all other evidentiary and proof matters. While it is unlikely that Congress
intended its choice of procedural method to speak to its preference for
resolution of other types of mass tort litigation, it does speak to its
preference to favor one category of litigant over another. . Thus, the
institutional defendant is favored over the consumer, and the putatively
irresponsible party is favored over the wholly innocent plaintiff.
IV. THE INDIRECT TREATMENT OF MASS TORT LITIGATION BY THE ACT
As mentioned earlier, the broad definition of "product" means that the
Act's substantive provisions will apply to most mass tort circumstances.57
The highly publicized provisions dealing with caps on punitive damages 8
and abrogation of joint and several liability for noneconomic losses59 are
the most important in this context.6° Because of the detailed treatment of
these provisions regarding run-of-the-mill product litigation in this
Symposium, I will focus on the important effect these provisions have on
mass tort litigation.
A. Punitive Damages Caps
One need only look at the history of asbestos litigation to see the
significant impact that punitive damages caps would have on the course of
all future mass tort litigation. The Act provides for a limit on punitive
damages of either two times the amount awarded for compensatory damages
or $250,000, whichever is greater.6' The given reasons for this limitation
57. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
58. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 109 (1996).
59. Id. § I10.
60. For a discussion of these provisions in general, see articles in this Symposium.
Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implicationsof Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN.
L. REV. 847 (1997) (noneconomic loss damages); Michael L. Rustad, How The Common
Good Is Servedby the Remedyof Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1997) (punitive
damages); see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability
Reform in 1997: History and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REV.
595 (1997); Ellen Wetheimer, The Products Liability Shell Game: A Response to Victor E.
Schwartz and Mark .4. Behrens, 64 TENN. L. REV. 627 (1997).
61. Id. § 108(b)(I). The Act also defines the substantive standard of conduct to be
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include the excessive nature of punitive damages awards over the last two
decades in particular, the runaway, speculative nature of jury verdicts, and
the disastrous affect on the American economy.62 There is significant
debate over the facts behind the assertions regarding the excesses and
uncertainties of punitive damages awards.63 In fact, mass tort litigation
involving asbestos has accounted for most of the punitive damages awards
of the last three decades.' Though the data suggesting no litigation crisis
in this area is persuasive, it is the purpose of this article to identify the
detrimental effect the Act will have on mass tort litigation regardless of the
basis of the underlying facts.
One has to have some theoretical and practical sense for the purpose of
punitive damages. Theoretically, punitive damages punish a seriously
culpable defendant and thus are expected to act as both a specific and a
general deterrent. They also have a retributive effect as between the
individual victim and the tortfeasor.6 5 Practically, they may encourage
some claimants to proceed when they would not otherwise pursue a claim
that entails low compensatory damages but allegedly egregious defendant
conduct.
1. Effect of Punitive Damages Availability on Claiming Behavior
Most plaintiffs tend not to pursue claims, even legitimate ones.66
proved in order for punitive damages to be awarded: conscious, flagrant indifference to the
rights or safety of others. Id. § 108(a). The Act also establishes clear and convincing
evidence as the burden of proof standard. Id. These provisions mirror many of the reforms
enacted at the state level and, to the extent one believes in a need for federal legislation, are
neither a surprise nor a cause for any particular concern in the mass tort arena.
62. Id. § 2(a)(l)-(6) (Findings and Purposes); S. REP. No. 104-69, at 35-37 (1995)
(discussing provision's purpose in predecessor Senate bill, S. 565, 104th Cong. (1995)).
63. See Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18 at 687-704 (summarizing
research on punitive damages awards and concluding that all studies come to the same
conclusion that no crisis exists in award of punitive damages); see also Michael L. Rustad,
How the Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV.
793 (1997).
64. See SEN. REP. No. 104-69 (1995); Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18 at 697-
99.
65. See Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 114 S.Ct. 650 (1993); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.
1986) (discussing propriety of punitive damages in mass tort cases); see generally
Symposium, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong Medicine or
Poison Pill?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 353 (1993); Michael Rustad, In DefenseofPunitiveDamages
in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1992).
66. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 1019.
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When the liklihood of success is made known, through the mass media or
otherwise, and a claimant is encouraged to believe that another entity may
be responsible for his or her harm, the combination of knowledge of culpa-
bility and the potential for damages recovery, including punitive damages,
increases the liklihood of a legal claim.67 The knowledge of potential
culpability alone without the potential for damages recovery, would arguably
decrease the chance that a claimant would indeed pursue a claim. This is
especially so given the negative impression most citizens have about the
litigation process. Taking away the opportunity to obtain some meaningful
retribution and to effect some behavioral changes will likely have the effect
of chilling what little chance there is for pursuit of meritorious claims.
The current tobacco litigation comes to mind as an example of the
significant negative effect the punitive damages reform will have on the
behavior of both claimants and putative tortfeasors." The fraud complaints
now being pursued may not have very significant dollar values in terms of
economic losses, but accepting the best case of liability for plaintiffs, the
conduct may be deserving of very significant censure that only comes with
the sting of a meaningful monetary award. The Act's provisions would
significantly lessen the chance for claim-encouraging recovery in these
cases. It would take many cases in which punitive damages were awarded
to achieve some even moderate level of censure, not to mention to the same
level which exists under the current system. This is because of the
combined effect of fewer claims being filed, reduced awards in those that
are actually litigated to judgment, and the fact that so few punitive damages
awards are actually meted out.
6 9
Another link between damages and claiming behavior must be accepted:
the likelihood that a plaintiffs law firm will take a case is directly related
to the liklihood of success and the value of that success if it is achieved.7 °
[F]ewer than one in five injured Amercans even considered the possibility of obtaining
compensation from others for their accidental injuries. Only one in ten took any action
to attempt to obtain such compensation. Only about one third of these or less than three
percent of all injured persons filed a liability lawsuit. A primary factor explaining these
low rates of claiming is an individual's tendency to attribute causation and blame for
their injuries to themselves or natural forces.
Id. Professors Hensler and Peterson attribute the recent increase in mass tort claims, in part,
to the increased availability of plaintiff law firms who have increased advertising, joined to
coordinate mass tort litigation, and who seem increasingly willing to take on mass torts
because of their increasing ability to handle the load. Id. at 1025-26. The willingness is at
least in part because of the expectation that the litigation "has some value that is great enough
to warrant a significant investment of time and capital in the litigation." Id. at 1032.
67. Id. at 1033, 1040-42.
68. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
69. See Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18, at 702-04 (summary of study
of punitive damages data concluding that punitive damage awards are rare).
70. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 12, at 1025-27, 1033.
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It must be acknowledged that in many circumstances, the likelihood that a
meritorious claim will be pursued is directly connected to the chance that
punitive damages may be awarded so that plaintiffs counsel can be
compensated for the time, money, and labor invested in mass tort claims
generally. The huge outlay of capital in the early stages of such litigation
is made tolerable only by the hope for success as the litigation progresses.
This hope for success and financial reward is made more likely by the
chance for punitive damages.
The Act's reform of punitive damages is very likely directly related to
the desire to make it less desirable for plaintiffs firms to undertake the
representation of product liability plaintiffs, especially mass tort plaintiffs.
The value of mass tort cases is extremely uncertain at the outset,71 and
until a value has been set by the judicial system, these claims have little
value given the combination of infant discovery, speculative causation, and
the dependence on punitive damages.72 If that value is artificially set by
this legislation, the entire course of mass tort litigation will be affected
because of the interdependence of the value of the later claims with the
earlier claims.7' That may not be undesirable, but it is a result that should
at least be acknowledged in the drafting of any such corrective legislation.
The uncertainty of the amount or likelihood of a punitive damage award
in the current system rests on plaintiffs as well as defendants, and to the
extent that this uncertainty should be corrected, it should be corrected
equitably for plaintiffs as well as defendants. If the uncertainty is corrected
on the side of reducing an award to some static or fixed sum, fewer claims
will be pursued by plaintiffs firms inclined to put up the capital necessary
to discover and prepare such claims. This is possibly the exact goal of the
legislation, but it is a result that limits the availability of the judicial system
for all members of society affected by these issues.
2. Effect of Punitive Damages Cap on Deterrence of Culpable Conduct
The overall effect of the punitive damages cap will be to reduce the
punishment meted out to wrongdoers who cause the most significant harm
to a totally arbitrary value which is wholly unrelated to the egregiousness
of the conduct. Congress says it seeks to restore some certainty and
predictability to punitive awards and that such damages are not intended to
compensate claimants with a windfall.74 Punitive damages are not to be
related to compensatory damages because they are for punishment and not
compensation.75 Yet Congress has defined a value to be placed on the
71. Id. at 1040.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1041-42.
74. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(b) (1996).
75. H.R. REP. No. 104-481, at 31 (1996) (punitive damages are not intended as
compensation for injured parties); S. REP. No. 104-69, at 39 (1995) (in response to argument
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conduct of the most egregious wrongdoers which is directly related to
compensatory damages;76 this is a totally contradictory result and one that
affects mass tort victims in a disproportionate way given the interdepen-
dence of claim values discussed above.
When pressed about the effect on many product liability claimants, such
as women and blue collar workers who may not have very large amounts
of economic loss and whose pain and suffering is traditionally underval-
ued,77 Congress responds that punitive damages are not compensatory and
should not take the place of those damages for a claimant whose compensa-
tory loss is small." The combined effect of this premise with the use of
compensatory damages as the benchmark for valuing punitives is especially
perverse in the context of mass torts. Persons who have relatively small
compensatory harm from a callously indifferent actor will lack the ability
to affect any meaningful punishment or retribution.
The Act fails to accommodate the mass tort claimant's circumstance,
especially given that it is the mass tort claimant who is most likely to be
able to prove the substantive standard, particularly given the importance of
the extent of the harm in determining such entitlement.7 9 Indeed, the Act
supports the conclusion that the greater the aggregate harm, the less likely
it is a wrongdoer will be punished because of the interdependence of mass
tort claims. The lower the initial claim values, the lower future claim values
will be and thus the less likely that punitive damages will be meaningful.
The Act further supports this underdeterrence argument in its provision
for a method by which a trial judge can add to an award of punitives
considered to be insufficient." The list of factors a judge may consider in
increasing an award includes the following:
[T]he cumulative deterrent effect of other losses, damages, and punishment
suffered by the defendant as a result of the misconduct, reducing the
amount of punitive damages on the basis of the economic impact and
severity of all measures to which the defendant has been or may be
subjected, including-
(I) compensatory and punitive damage awards to similarly situated
claimants."
that the proportionality requirement unfairly affects women and other groups, report states
that "punitive damages have absolutely nothing to do with compensating an individual for
a loss").
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. See Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18 at 734-35, 743-47 (discussing
disparate of tort reform on women and blue collar workers); see also S. REP. No. 104-69,
at 39 (1995).
78. S. REP. No. 104-69, at 39 (1995).
79. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(3)(B) (1996) (factors such as liklihood of
serious harm, degree of awareness, and duration of misconduct relevant to increasing award).
80. Id. § 108(b)(3).
81. Id. § 108(b)(3)(B)(viii) (emphasis added).
1997]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Though compensatory awards are unrelated to deterrence, the Act specifical-
ly acknowledges that they can be considered as such in evaluating the
cumulative deterrent effect of all awards.82 This statement is by its very
nature inconsistent and has its most pernicious effect in mass tort cases.
Punitive damages are not to be considered compensatory but compensatory
damages are to be considered punitive. And because of the interdependence
of claims, the effect on mass tort litigation is profound because the value of
early punitive damage awards directly affects the value of subsequent,
similarly situated claims. Thus, the existence of low early awards will have
an exponential effect on later claim values, and therefore, on any real or
imagined deterrent effect on the tortfeasor. If those early awards are
artificially established, the spiral toward fewer claims and fewer damage
awards begins.
B. Several Liability for Noneconomic Loss
Usually, only a few defendants are involved in most mass tort cases,
asbestos litigation being the exception. The joint and several nature of the
liability in many jurisdictions is one method by which plaintiffs are assured
full compensation, as was the intent of that doctrine given the truly
indivisible nature of most tort harms. The provisions of the Act which
make liability for noneconomic loss several and apportioned83 would fall
hard on mass tort claimants. As this topic is discussed generally in this
Symposium, 84 I will comment on it only regarding the effect on mass tort
claimants.
One obvious reason for the disparate impact of this provision on mass
tort litigation claimants is that mass tortfeasors often escape the burdensome-
ness of mass tort litigation by resorting to bankruptcy protection. A.H.
Robins Pharmaceutical Company (Dalkon Shield litigation), Johns-Manville
Corporation (asbestos litigation), and Dow Coming (silicone gel breast
implant litigation) are three primary examples. 5 While there may be one
primary defendant in these cases, as with A.H. Robins and Dow Coming,
in most product liability cases there are many defendants other than the
manufacturers who are involved. If several liability were to apply to cases
involving these defendants, plaintiffs would very likely recover nothing of
their pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment damages because of the major
contribution these wrongdoers have to the harm. Apportionment and several
82. Id.
83. Id. I10(a) & (b).
84. Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implicationsof Tort Reformfor Women,
64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997); Mark McLaughlin Hager, The Moral Economy of Victim
Responsibility:Substance and Product Abuse in Tort Reform's "Common Sense ", 64 TENN.
L. REV. 749 (1997).
85. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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liability doctrines do not mean the remaining defendants are not culpable,
but rather that culpability will have been established. Further, apportion-
ment of tort damages is rarely accomplished by some logical or meaningful
method related to culpability as the Act implies.86 Rather, it has often
been the case that apportionment seems to be totally arbitrary.87
Noneconomic losses are very often the most important and valuable
damages a tort plaintiff has since they are arguably the most deeply felt:
who would trade places for even a nanosecond with someone who has
cancer from a toxic exposure or who cannot bear children because of a
defective contraceptive device? These damages are what constitute the
general harm that the tort seeks to redress and this is why medical expenses
and lost wages are called "special damages"; they are unique to each
individual and do not constitute the very nature of the tort."8 The risk of
making such damages unrecoverable because a tortfeasor has caused so
much harm that it files bankruptcy is, at the very least, unfair to the injured
victims.
The Act requires the jury to apportion responsibility to all persons
responsible for the claimant's harm, whether or not such person is a party
to the action.89 As to mass tort claimants, the burden of bankruptcy now
clearly falls on the victim, even though it is as a result of the widespread
harm that the bankruptcy occurred.9° In fact, mass tort defendants have
proved to be closely connected to one another in their wrongdoing, with the
DES and asbestos cases serving as the main examples. To apportion
liability in this context would be a fortiori meaningless and arbitrary and
would render the recovery of damages unprincipled.
86. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § I I0(b)(2) (1996).
87. S. REP. No. 104-69, at 80 (1995) (minority view of Sen. Hollings that apportion-
ment cannot be meaningfully accomplished). For a full treatment of allocation issues in mass
tort litigation, see Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, UnderstandingState Contribution Laws and Their
Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1745 (1995) (stating
that several-only liability statutes are riddled with mass tort exceptions because of the
indivisibility of certain kinds of harms caused by individual defendants).
88. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 201 (1991); Steven P. Croley & John D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Pain and Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (1995);
Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18, at 706-07. For a summary of the data on
recovery of noneconomic losses, see Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law, supra note 18, at 708-
13.
89. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 11 0(b)(2) (1996). The Conference Report makes it clear
that this includes bankrupt persons and employers. H.R. REP. No. 104-481, at 32 (1996).
90. See Eggen, supra note 87, at 1745-46 (discussing future of joint and several
liability in mass torts; stating "the problem of involvency looms large in mass torts and
concluding "it would be imprudent to automatically adopt several only liability as a palliative
for nonsettling defendants").
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Even if one could feel confident that apportionment would be fairly and
reasonably accomplished, Congress has entirely failed to identify the effect
of a settling defendant on the recovery of the plaintiff or the liability of the
nonsettling tortfeasors. This issue has proved a thorny one in most state
efforts at reform of this area.9 The magnitude of the harms, the interde-
pendence of the claims, and the common settlement of these actions is
inadequately explored.
As a general principle, the idea of allocating responsibility in some
proportion to culpability is intuitively appealing.92 In fact, the American
Law Institute is currently working on a project dealing with apportionment
of responsibility. 93 This issue has received various forms of treatment
from the states, evidencing that there does not appear one logically or
intuitively correct conclusion. Before reaching any consensus, the effect on
mass tort claimants should be directly and fully addressed.
C. Workers' Compensation Subrogation
The workers' compensation subrogation provision94 may be important
in mass tort cases given that much of the toxic exposure is in the workplace
setting (e.g., asbestos). Many states already provide subrogation of the
insurer or employer to a products liability judgment against a manufacturer
or seller, though there is significant difference among the states in this
practice. This provision of the Act has been thoroughly treated elsewhere
in this Symposium,95 so my observations will be few.
Rights between employees, employers, and manufacturers in the toxic
substances context continue to be problematic. The employer who has
control over the workplace may often be at least negligent for failing to
distribute risk information, maintaining a safe workplace generally and/or
providing proper safety equipment. Occupational disease compensation
under the workers' compensation systems in this country has been erratic at
best.96
91. Id. at 1746.
92. I have advocated such an approach in the context of comparative fault. See Mary
J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in
Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281 (1994).
93. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1994).
94. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 111 (1996).
95. Thomas A. Eaton, Revisisting the Intersection of Workers' Compensation and
Product Liability: An Assessment of a Proposed Federal Solution to an Old Problem, 64
TENN. L. REV. 881 (1997).
96. See D. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 1085 (3d ed. 1996); see
generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Occupational Safety and Health: Policy Options and Political
Reality, 31 Hous. L. REV. 13 (1994).
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The asbestos litigation is the one piece of mass tort litigation where
Congress has repeatedly been asked to intervene to insure compensation for
those occupationally exposed and where Congress has repeatedly refused.
97
When one thinks of mass tort litigation and the possible solutions needed,
some form of compensation scheme seems to cry out in this area. The
private parties seek to settle these claims en masse, but there is significant
resistance. 98
It is difficult to determine why no compensation scheme has been
devised for asbestos claimants. However, there are a variety of possible
explanations. First, none of the parties have as their self-interest the
resolution of these claims by legislative enactment, or at least some of the
parties with influence have no interest in seeing such legislation. Second,
the judicial system is adequately, efficiently, and fairly adjudicating these
claims so there is no need for intervention although this explanation would
seem to fly in the face of reality.99 Third, Congress's other legislative
agenda has not, to date, included an asbestos compensation plan for some
other political reasons.
The current reform Act has taken decades to produce and it took a
Republican victory at the polls to effect it. It does seem incongruous that
Congress has attempted to address the product liability litigation "crisis" and
the supposed inefficiency and unfairness that "crisis" has wrought, but it has
failed to deal directly with the one piece of litigation that has contributed
enormously to the very "crisis" under consideration. Asbestos litigation has
led to the most punitive damage awards, the imposition of liability on
product sellers for asbestos products made by others, the unfair apportion-
ment of liability to defendants who have managed to avoid bankruptcy,
97. Examples of unenacted legislation include: Asbestos Workers' Recovery Act, H.R.
1626, 99th Cong. (1985); Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983, H.R. 3175, 98th
Cong. (1983); Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735, 97th
Cong. (1982); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980, S. 2847, 96th Cong.
(1980); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1979, H.R. 2740, 96th Cong. (1979).
98. One asbestos litigation settlement class was recently decertified by the Third
Circuit. Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, If 7 S. Ct. 379 (1996). Another case was recently upheld
in the Fifth Circuit. In re Asbestos Litig., 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996).
Much has been written on the settlement class generally and on these two settlement
classes in particular, and most of it is against the settlements. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995).
The court system continues to grapple with the problems of compensation and judicial
administration in the asbestos cases thirty years after Clarence Borel succeeded in his first
case. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Yet, Congress
does not act.
99. Most participants agree that thejudicial system is doing an abysmal job at keeping
pace with the claims filed and processing them fairly. See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 6 (1991).
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product misuse by workers and their employers, and unfair allocation of
responsibility under state workers' compensation schemes. Creating a
compensation scheme for asbestos claimants would indeed be a daunting
task, as the failure of the Wellington Group's efforts in the 1980s will at-
test, 00 but it is an alternative worth considerable exploration given the
complex nature of that litigation and the seemingly ineffective application
to it of traditional rules and procedures. Perhaps, given Congress's concern
with the over-compensation of product liability claimants, Congress is
unable to digest the idea that many claimants will be compensated under a
legislative compensation scheme which would not be under the current
traditional litigation model.
D. Other Provisions
The Act's provisions regarding product seller liability and defenses do
not appear to impact mass tort litigation in any specific way as a result of
the uniquenes of that litigation. Product sellers are certainly sued in mass
tort cases, but there does not seem to be anything special about the presence
of product sellers in mass tort cases. In aggregated mass tort cases, as in
class actions or through consolidation procedures, the category of defendants
is likely to be similar in nature given the commonality of issues that bring
such cases to aggregation. For example, tobacco manufacturers, not distrib-
utors or retailers, were sued in the recent tobacco class action.'"' And the
same is true in most recent class actions.'
0 2
The misuse and intoxication defenses,10 3 dealing as they do with
individual claimant circumstances, would similarly not impact mass tort
litigation in ways relevant to the differences in mass torts. This by no
means should be taken as an approval of those provisions; but rather that
they do not affect mass tort litigation in meaningfully different ways than
other products cases.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the recent product liability reform measure
enacted by Congress in 1996 and evaluated its effect on the very important
100. Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem,
33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984).
101. Castano v. The Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995) (HIV-contaminated blood solids manufactured and sold by
defendants); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (consolidation order of breast implant litigation).
103. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §§ 104, 105 (1996). It would appear that the misuseand
intoxication defenses would likely be irrelevant in most mass tort cases.
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product liability cases known as mass torts. While the Act seems on its face
not to deal very meaningfully with mass tort litigation, the reality is that it
deals very significantly with such cases, and all to the significant detriment
of claimants. The interdependent nature of the value of mass tort claims,
the large quantity of them and their commonality between the liability issues
and the defendants combine to suggest that the Act's reforms would cause
a significant artificial reduction in the value of the aggregated claims and
not just on individual claims. This result unfairly and unevenly poses a
burden on claimants to the great benefit of those irresponsible institutional
actors who have caused the greatest harm.'04
While there may well be a need for federalizing much of the law which
complicates mass torts, the Act's provisions deal with product liability
litigation as an integrated whole when there are meaningful normative
differences between most ordinary product liability cases and what I have
defined here as mass tort cases. While calls for federalizing choice of law
rules,' ° reforming class action procedure reforms,"°' and other studies
of aggregative measures0 7 have been discussed for the last decade,
Congress has nevertheless chosen to treat mass torts as any other product
liability case. This myopic vision, whether through benign neglect or willful
misunderstanding, evidences a dangerous lack of appreciation for the unique
characteristics of the most puzzling litigation problem facing the nation's
courts. While there might be much to be reformed in the processing of
mass torts, Congress's recent effort is not the vehicle.
104. On the pitfalls of treating interdependent issues and defendants differently, see
William Powers, Jr., Some Pitfalls of Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 38 ARIz. L. REV.
909, 913, 915 (1996).
105. Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice ofLawforMass-TortLitigation, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1623 (1992).
106. See Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (calling for specific authority
to certify classes for settlement only).
107. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (1994).
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